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Quantitaüve estimates o f the economic damages of d imate change 
usually are based on agg regate relationships linking average tem-
perature change to loss in gross domestic product (GDP). However, 
there is a clear need for fur ther detai l in the regional and sectoral 
dimensions o f impact assessments to design and priorit ize adapta-
r o n strategies. New developments in regional climate model ing 
and physical-impact modeling in Europe allow a better exploration 
of those dimensions. This article quantifies the potential conse-
quences of climate change in Europe in four market impact cat-
egories (agriculture, river f loods, coastal áreas, and tourism) and one 
nonmarket impact (human health). The methodo logy integrates 
a set of cohererrt, high-resolution climate change projections and 
physical models into an economic modeling framework. W e find 
that if the climate of the 2080s were to occur today, the annual loss 
in household welfare in the European Union (EU) resulting from 
the four market impacts would range between 0 . 2 - 1 % . If the wel-
fare loss is assumed to be constant over time, climate change may 
ha!ve the EU's annual welfare growth. Scenarios wi th warmer tem-
peratures and a higher rise in sea lev el result in more severe eco-
nomic damage. However, the results show that there are large 
variations across European regions. Southern Europe, the British 
(síes, and Central Europe North appear most sensitive to cl imate 
change. Northern Europe, on the other hand, is the only región w i t h 
net economic benef i ts, driven mainly by the posit ive effects on ag-
riculture. Coastal systems, agriculture, and river f lood ing are the 
most important of the four market ¡mpacts assessed. 
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Adaptation is becoming a key issue of post-2012 intemational climate policy negotiations. The December 2009 Copenha-
gen Accord (1) establishes that by 2020 developed couiitries will 
provide US$ 100 billion per year to address the needs of de-
veloping countríes, including funding for adaptation. Indeed, 
even ambitious mitigation policies [e.g., the 2 °C target proposed 
by the European Union (EU) and endorsed by the G8 (2, 3)] will 
need to be complemented by adaptation strategies to lessen the 
impact of residual warmíng (4). Europe is preparíng for a co-
ordinated adaptation climate strategy from 2013. as set out in the 
European Commission White Paper on Adaptation (5). One of its 
main conclusions is that much still is unknown about the potential 
i mpacts of climate change on the European economy as a whole 
or with respect to different economic sectors and geographical 
regions of Europe (6-9). 
The quantitative assessment of the economic impacts of climate 
change is vital forjustifying strategies tocurb global warming and 
minimize detrimental consequences. Evaluating the effects of 
climate change in the very long temí is an extremely complex issue 
because of incomplete scientiflc methodologies and data gaps. 
For this reason, the assessment must account for the many sources 
of uncertainty, including future climate. demographic change, 
economic development. and technological change. 
Most studies (e.g., ÍO-15) have focused on climate damage 
functions as reduced-form fomiulations linking climate variables 
to economic impacts [usually average global temperature to 
gross domestic product (GDP)]. Nevertheless, such a top-down 
approach is unsatisfactoiy for the following reasons: Damage 
estimates often are derived from the iiterature. thus oríginating 
from different and possibly inconsistent climate scenarios, They 
also lack the necessary geographical resolution for assessing re-
gional impacts and priorítizing adaptation policies. Moreover, 
only the average temperature and precipitation usually are in-
cluded. ignoring other moments of the probabilistic distribution 
and other relevant climate variables. 
We present here a high-resolution. regionally focused, and 
integrated assessment of the physical and economic effects of 
climate change in Europe. The analysis is innovative because it 
integrates (/) climate data with high space-time resolution; (ü) 
detailed modeling tools specific for each impact categoiy con-
sidered; and (ni) a multisectoral, multiregional economic model. 
The appraisal presented herein builds on examples of assess-
ments made elsewhere (e.g., for the United States, see reís. 16-
20; for a global assessment, see ref. 21). 
Five impact categories have been addressed in this study: ag-
riculture, river basins, coastal systems, tourism, and human 
health. Tríese five aspects are highly sensitive to changes in mean 
climate and climate extremes. For this study the EU has been 
divided into Ave regions to simplify ínterpretation (Fig. SI): 
Northern Europe, the British Isles, Centra! Europe North, Cen-
tral Europe South, and Southern Europe. 
Methodological Framework 
The consistent methodological fiamework that integrates the 
climate data, physical-impact models, and economic models is 
shown in Fig. S2. In the first stage, daily and 50-km resolution 
climate data are obtained from climate models. In the secónd 
stage, these data are used as input to run the five physical-impact 
models. (See SI Text for detailed explanations on the models and 
Table SI for their specific climate data input.) 
In the third stage, the physical-impact models and their as-
sociated direct economic effects are introduced into a multi-
sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (22), 
General Equilibrium Model for Energy-Economy-Environment 
Interactions (GEM-E3 Europe), which models most EU coun-
tries individually. 
This study has other distinctive features. We have modeled the 
economic effects of future climate change (projected for the 
2080s) on the current economy as of 2010. Several authors have 
followed this approach {e.g., 23). This quasi-static analysis would 
be the equivalen! of having the 2080s climate in today's economy. 
The alternative approach (followed, e.g., in ref. 24) would be to 
model the effect of the future climate on the future economy. 
Implementing a static approach has the advantage that hypothe-
ses on the future evolution of the economy over the next eight 
decades are not needed, thereby minimizing the number of 
assumptions. Moreover, the interpretation of the results becomes 
simpler. Within this quasi-static economic metrics, we alsopresent 
undiscounted impacts. Time discounting is a key and controversial 
issue in evaluating the impacts of climate change (25,26). 
A baseline scenario has been run for 2010 assuming no climate 
change. The alternative scenario considered the influence of 
climate change in the economy. The results presented compare 
the valúes of welfare and GDPof the climate scenario with those 
of the baseline scenario. 
This study also has estimated "potential impacts'" (27), which 
do not consider public adaptation policies. The assessment of 
potential impacts in various sectors facilitates the identification 
of priorities in public adaptation policies. In the models applied 
in this analysis, only prívate adaptation actions have been taken 
into account (e.g., farm level adaptation in agriculture), but no 
new explicit public adaptation policies have been considered. 
Although the coastal systems DIVA model uses a more so-
phisticated cost-benefit framework to determine the optimal 
level of adaptation, in this study, this option has been disabled 
to measure the potential impact of sea-level rise (SLR). 
Scenarios. We have considered four climate futures for the 2080s 
Table 1) to reflect the uncertainty associated with the driving 
orces of global emissions and the response of climate to green-
house gas (GHG) concentration. Two global socioeconomic 
scenarios have been selected from the Intergovemmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Sce-
narios (SRES) (28): the high -emission A2 scenario and the lower-
emission B2 scenario (C0 2 concentraron of 709 ppm and 560 
ppm by the end of this centuiy, respective ly). For each SRES 
scenario, climate output from two state-of-tlíe-art regional cli-
mate models (RCMs), nested within a global climate model 
(GCM), have been selected from the Prediction of Regional 
Scenarios and Uncertainties for Defining European Climate 
Change Risks and Effects (PRUDENCE) project (29). Daily 
RCM output at 50-km resolution has been used to drive the 
physical-impact models. In the following, all climate change 
numbers refer to a comparison of the 30-y periods 1961-1990 
and 2071-2100. 
Temperature and Predpitation. The scenarios considered lead to 
an average temperature increase in Europe between 2.5 °C and 
5.4 °C (Table 1). These figures dependon the GHG emission sce-
nario chosen and the climate model used (temperature and pre-
dpitation maps appear in Figs. S3 and S4). Hereafter, the climate 
futures are called "scenarios" and are distinguished by the EU 
temperature increase: 2.5 °C (B2 HadAM3-HIRHAM), 3.9 °C 
(A2 HadAIvB-HIRHAM), 4.1 °C (B2 ECHAM4-RCAO), and 
5.4 °C (A2 ECHAM4-RCAO). Northern Europe is the área with 
the highest temperature increase in the 2.5 °C and 3.9 °C sce-
narios, whereasin the 4.1 °C and 5.4 °C scenarios, Central Europe 
South and Southern Europe would experience the largest tem-
perature increase. The more oceanic British Isles have the lowest 
temperature increase throughout all scenarios. The global tem-
perature increase of the scenarios is in the range of 2.3-3.1 °C. 
One A2 simulation shows lower warming than one of the B2 
simulations; it should be kept in mind that modeled projections of 
Table 1. Summary of socioeconomic and climate scenarios 
Scenario 
'orld population in 2100 (1012) 
'orld GDP in 2100 (1012, 
D2 concentraron (ppm) 
Temperature (°Q* 
World 
EU* 
Southern Europe 
Central Europe South 
Central Europe North 
British Isles 
Northern Europe 
Predpitation (%)* 
EU* 
Southern Europe 
Central Europe South 
Central Europe North 
British Isles 
Northern Europe 
1990 US$) 
Sea level rise (high climate 
2.5 °C 
10.4 
235 
561 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.4 
2.3 
1.6 
2.9 
1 
-7 
2 
3 
-S 
10 
49 
3.9 °C 
15.1 
243 
709 
3.1 
3.9 
4.1 
3.9 
3.7 
2.S 
4.1 
-2 
-15 
-2 
1 
-2 
10 
56 
4.1 °C 
10.4 
235 
561 
2.3 
4.1 
4.3 
4.4 
4.0 
3.2 
3.6 
2 
-13 
- 4 
6 
10 
19 
51 
5.4 °C 
15.1 
243 
709 
3.1 
5.4 
5.6 
6.0 
5.5 
3.9 
4.7 
- 6 
-28 
-16 
- 1 
5 
24 
59 
sensitivity} (cm) 
*lncrease in the period 2071-2100 compared with 1961-1990. 
'European reglons: Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and 
Bulgaria), Central Europe South (France, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Romanía, and Slovenia), Central Europe North (Belgium, The Neth-
erlands, Germany, and Poland), British Isles (Ireland and United Kingdom), 
and Northern Europe (Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). 
regional climate change have a larger spread than projections of 
global change. 
The regional precipitation pattern is similar in all scenarios. 
TTie Central Europe South and Southern Europe regions would 
experience annuaí decreases compared with the 1961-1990 con-
trol period, whereas most other EU regions would have posi-
tive precipitation changes in all scenarios but with large seasonal 
difiere nces. 
Sea-Level Rise. According to the IPCC (30, 31), the uncertainty 
range of the projected SLR is wide. Given recent evidence 
on accelerated SLR (32), we consider only the high-climate-
sensitivity case. This case leads to a global SLR in the range of 
49-59 cm by the end of the century (Table 1). TTie high range of 
SLR of the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), 88 cm, also 
has been studied for the coastal system impact as a variant of the 
5.4 °C scenario. 
Results 
Agriculture. Because the production and quality of cultivated 
crops and their use of water are influenced directly by local 
climate variables and atmospheric CO2, agriculture is particu-
larly susceptible to climate change (33-36). Agriculture is the 
mam user of land and water and still plays a dominant economic 
role in many rural áreas of Europe. Previous studies have shown 
that the stress imposed by climate change on agriculture will 
intensify the regional disparities between European countries 
We investigated the response of the distribution of premium 
and productivity of crops in Europe to potential climate change 
induced by increased GHG forcing. TTie assessment linked bio-
physical and statistical models in a rigorous and testable method-
ology, based on the current understanding of processes of crop 
growth and development, to quantify crop responses to changing 
climate conditions. 
We found that the 2080s climate would have a rather dramatic 
spatial agricultural effect and a serious impact on aggregated 
regional production (Table 2). In the 2080s the scenarios of lower 
warming could lead to small changes in EU yields, whereas the 
5.4 °C scenario could mean a reduction in crop yields by 10%. All 
Table 2. Physical annual impartí in agrkulture, river basins, 
coastal systems, and tourism of 2080s dimate-change scenarios 
in the current European economy 
Physical impacts 
Physical impacts 
Southern 
Europe 
as estimated by 
Yield change (%)' 
2.5 °C 
3.9 °C 
4.1 °C 
5.4'C 
Physical impacts 
0 
-12 
-4 
-27 
as estimated by 
People affected (1,000s/y)* 
2.5 °C 
3.9 "C 
4.1 °C 
5.4 °C 
Physical impacts 
46 
49 
9 
-4 
European regions* 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Central 
Europe 
North 
British 
Isles 
the agrkulture model 
5 
5 
3 
-3 
the river 
117 
101 
84 
125 
-1 
-3 
2 
-8 
flooding 
103 
110 
119 
198 
-9 
-11 
15 
19 
model 
12 
48 
43 
79 
as estimated by the coastal systems model 
People flooded (I.OOOs/y)1 
2.5 °C 
3.9 "C 
4.1 °C 
5.4 °C 
258 
456 
313 
474 
5.4 °C, 88 cm SLR 1,091 
Physical impacts 
82 
144 
85 
158 
512 
345 
450 
347 
459 
2,398 
as estimated by the tourism model 
Bed nights change (%)' 
2.5 °C 
3.9 "C 
4.1 °C 
5.4 °C 
- 1 
-1 
-2 
-4 
2 
3 
14 
17 
2 
3 
13 
16 
70 
136 
36 
207 
1,279 
I 
3 
4 
14 
18 
Northern 
Europe 
37 
39 
36 
52 
-2 
9 
-4 
-3 
20 
40 
20 
56 
272 
4 
6 
20 
25 
EU 
3 
- 2 
3 
-10 
276 
318 
251 
396 
775 
1,225 
851 
1,353 
5,552 
1 
1 
6 
7 
•European regions: Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and 
Bulgaria), Central Europe South (France, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Romanía, and Slovenia}, Central Europe North (Belgium, The Neth-
erlands, Germany, and Poland), British Isles (Ireland and United Kingdom), 
and Northern Europe (Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). 
'Yield changes compared with 1961-1990 period and weighted by thecoun-
try agricultura valué added. 
'Differences compared with the 1961-1990 period. 
§Differences compared with 1995. 
''Differences compared with 2005. 
2080s scenarios show considerable regional disparities in impacts 
on agriculture. Southern Europe would experience yield losses 
that would become relatively high under the 5.4 °C scenario— 
about 25%. The Central Europe regions would experience 
modérate changes in yield. In all scenarios Northern Europe 
would benefit from positive yield changes, and, to a lesser extent, 
the British Isles would benefit in the 4.1 °C and 5.4 °C scenarios. 
These effects result from the dominance of the longer growing 
season. A group of countries (e.g., Ireland, Belgium, Germany, 
France and the Netherlands) may be at risk if limitations on the 
use of fertilizers in agriculture are considered. Romanía would 
experience higher potential gain, partly because of the consid-
erable weight of agriculture in its economy. 
River Floods. River floods are the most common natural disaster 
in Europe (37), resulting in large economic losses through direct 
damage to infrastructure, property, and agricultural land and 
through indirect losses within flooded áreas and beyond. The 
costs arising from floods have increased rapidly during the last 
decades, although the observed upward trend in flood damage 
can be attributed largely to socioeconomic factors (38). Global 
warming generally is expected to increase the magnitude and 
frequency of extreme precipitation events (39, 40), which may 
lead to more intense and more frequent river floods. 
Estimates of changes in the frequency and severity of river 
floods are based on simulations using the LISFLOOD hydro-
logical model (41). This model has been developed for oper-
ational flood forecasting at the European scale and is a 
combination of a grid-based water-balance model and a one-
dimensional hydrodynamicchannel flow-routing model. Because 
it is spatially distributed, the model can take account of the 
spatial variation in land use, soil properties, and climate varia-
bles. The LISFLOOD model transfers the climate-forcing data 
(temperature, precipitation, radiation, wind-speed, and humid-
ity) into estimates of river runoff. By using extreme valué anal-
ysis, changes in flood magnitude at different return periods are 
derived (42). From the calculated flood inundation depths, 
expected annual economic damage and the population exposed 
are estimated using country-specific flood depth-damage func-
tions, information on land use, and data on population density. 
The projections assume no growth in exposed valúes and pop-
ulation or adjustments of current flood protection standards and 
henee consider only the effects of climate change on flood risk. 
River flooding would affect 250,000-400,000 additional people 
per year in Europe by the 2080s (Table 2). The increase in direct 
damage from river floods in the 2080s ranges from €7.7 billion to 
€15 billion, more than doubling the annual average damages 
during the period 1961-1990. In general, the higher the mean 
temperature increase, the higher are the projected increase in 
people exposed to floods and the expected damages. The impacts 
at the regional level vary substantially, deviating strongly from 
the EU average. Flood damages and people affected are pro-
jected to increase across much of Western Europe, the British 
Isles, and the Central Europe regions. Decreases in flood damage 
are projected consistently for northeastern parts of Europe be-
cause of a reduction in spring snowmelt floods. 
Coastal Systems. Coastal regions are áreas where wealth and 
population are concentrated and are undergoing rapid increases 
in population and urbanization (43, 44). SLR is a direct threat 
to productive infrastructures and to the residential and natural 
heritage zones. 
The bottom-up coast assessment is based on the Dynamic and 
Interactive Vulnerability Assessment (DIVA) tool, an integrated 
impact-adaptation model allowing interaction between a series of 
biophysical and socioeconomic modules to assess the impacts of 
SLR (45). A major weakness of earlier studies is that they exam-
ined only a subset of the physical consequences of SLR; DIVA 
allows all the major direct impacts of SLR to be evaluated 
quantitatively in physical terms. These effects include (i) direct 
impacts on erosión, {«) increased flood risk and inundation, (¡w) 
coastal wetland loss and change, and (iv) surface salinization. 
Adaptation is an explicit part of the model, and the benefits of 
a range of homogenous adaptation options can be explored to-
gether with their costs, including options from no protection 
to total protection, together with intermedíate options which 
charactenze more realistic adaptation responses in the context 
of Europe. 
The number of people annually affected by sea floods in the 
reference year (1995) is estimated to be 36,000. Without adap-
tation, the number of people affected annually by flooding in the 
2080s increases significantly in all scenarios and ranges from 
775,000-5.5 million people (Table 2). The British Isles, Central 
Europe North, and Southern Europe are the áreas potentially 
most affected by coastal floods. However, when adaptation (dikes 
and beach nourishment) is taken into account, the number of 
people potentially exposed to floods is reduced significantly. 
The economic costs to people who might migrate because of 
land loss (through submergence and erosión) also increases 
substantially under a high rate of SLR, assuming no adaptation, 
and the costs increase over time. When adaptation measures are 
implemented, this displacement of people becomes a minor 
impact. This result indícales the importan! benefit of adaptation 
to coastal populations affected by SLR. 
Tourism. Tourism is a major economic sector in Europe, with the 
current annual flow of tourists from Northern to Southern 
Europe accounting for one in every six tourist arrivals in the 
world (46). Climate change has the potential to alter tourism 
patteras in Europe radicaíly by inducing changes in destinations 
and seasonal demand structure (47). 
The tourism study simulated the major outdoor international 
tourism flows within Europe. The study represents an improve-
ment on earlier work because it integrales the climate componen! 
of tourist activity (climate suitabílity was expressed wrth the 
tourism climate Índex, see ref. 48) with the economic analysis of 
tourist demand flows, considering also seasonality effects in a 
tourist regional demand model. 
Forthe2080s, thedistributionofclimaticconditionsinEurope 
is projected to change significantly. For the spring season, all 
climate model results show a clear extensión towardthe north of 
the zone under good conditions. Excellent conditions in spring, 
which are found mainly in Spain in the baseline period, could 
spread across most of the Mediterranean coastal áreas by the 
2080s. Changes in autumn are comparable to the ones in spring. 
In summer, the zone of good conditions also expands toward the 
north but at the expense of the south, where climatic conditions 
would deteriórate. These results match the findings of earlier 
studies into the impact of climate change on climate suitability 
for tourism {e.g., 49). 
Southern Europe, which currently accounts for more than half 
of the total EU capacity of tourist accommodation, could be the 
only región with a decline in bed nights, estimated to range be-
tween 1% and 4% depending on the climate scenario (Table 2). 
The rest of Europe is projected to have large increases in bed 
nights, in the range of 15-25% for the two warmest scenarios. 
The changes in bed nights caused by changing climate conditions 
can be estimated econometrically, leading to changes in expen-
diture associated with bed nights. In all climate scenarios there 
would be additional expenditures, with a relatively small EU-
wide positive impact of €4-18 billion, depending on the scenario 
and climate model used. 
A key assumption is that the tourism system has full flexibility 
in responding to climate change. Climate change can affect 
overall demand, and the seasonal distribution of tourists is de-
termined exclusively by climate factors. However. if institutional 
factors (e.g., schoolholidays) limit that seasonal flexibility, results 
could be quite different. In that case, for example, Southern 
Europe might not be able to compénsate for the summer losses 
with gains in the shoulder seasons. 
Human Health. Climate change has a range of complex inter-
linkages with health (50), mcluding direct impacts, such as 
temperature-reí ated illness and death and the health impacts of 
extreme weather events. Other impacts follow more indirect 
pathways, such as those that give rise to water- and food-borne 
diseases, vector-borne diseases, or food and water shortages. 
There is a direct relationship between mortality and temper-
ature that differs by climatic zone and geographical área (51). 
Migh ambient temperature is associated with mortality from heat 
stroke and also illnesses (e.g., cardiovascular diseases). However, 
rising temperatures also reduce winter excess deaths. The pro-
jections of the impacts of climate change on heat-related and 
cold-related mortality were based on empirical relationships 
between mortality and current temperature (51-53). The study 
used daily projected temperature Information at a 50-km grid 
resolution across Europe, combined with country-spe cifre data 
from socioeconomic scenarios for population and age structure 
and with background health incidence data for both current and 
future periods. Impacts were estimated using temperature-
response functions, which provide relationships between daily 
mortality and daily temperature. These functions usually are 
represented as sepárate functions for heat and cold effects, 
rehecting the fact that mortality increases at low or high tem-
peratures above certain threshold levéis, i.e., around a broad 
central range over which there is little response. 
In the 2080s, without adaptation measures and physiological 
acclimatization, the effect of heat- and cold-related mortality 
changes depends on the set of exposure-response functions used. 
The range of estimates for the annual mcrease in mortality 
(caused by heat and without acclimatization) is between 60,000 
and 165,000. Physiological and behavioral responses to the 
warmer climate would have a very significant effect in reducing 
this mortality, potentially reducing the estimates by a factor of 
five. The range of estimates for the decrease in cold-related 
mortality is between 60,000 and 250,000, although there also may 
be a decline in the sensitivity of mortality to cold. It is notable that. 
in aggregate, the decreases in cold-related mortality may out-
weigh the increases in heat-related mortality. This result can be 
understood because, based on the impact functions used in the 
study, the current baseline climate of Europe is associated with 
more deaths in the winter than in the summer. The cold- and heat-
related impacts are estimated using simple epidemiologically 
derived functions for daily mortality; however, there are impor-
tant differences in the impact pathways, linkages with morbidity. 
exposure patterns, and other determinants between the heat- and 
cold-related deaths. 
Impact on the Overall Economy. The consequences of climate 
change on the four market impact categories (agriculture, river 
fioods, coastal systems, and tourism) can be valued in monetary 
terms because they directly affect sectoral markets and—via the 
cross-sector linkages—the overall economy. They also influence 
the consumption behavior of households and tnerefore house-
hold welfare. 
If the climate of the 2080s occurred today, the annual damage 
of climate change to the EU economy in terms of GDP loss is 
estimated to be between €20 billion for the 2.5 °C scenario and 
€65 billion for the 5.4 °C scenario with high SLR (Fig. 1). 
However, the damages expressed in GDP loss underestimate 
the actual losses. For ínstance, the repair of damage to buildings 
caused by river fioods increases production (GDP), because it 
represents a kind of obliged consumption. but does not imptove 
consumer welfare. (Tabie S2 details the changes in GDP and 
welfare for all scenarios and market impact categories.) The ag-
gregated impact on the four categories would lead to an EU 
annual welfare loss between 0.2% for the 2.5 °C scenario and 1% 
for the 5.4 °C scenario with a high SLR (88 cm) (Fig. 2). The long-
term historie EU annual growth of welfare is around 2%. As-
suming that the annual loss is constant over time, climate change 
would reduce the annual welfare growth by between 0.2% 
and 1%. 
EU-aggregated economic impact figures hide a high variation 
across regions, climate scenarios, and impact categories. In all 
2080s scenarios, most regions would undergo welfare losses, with 
the exception of Northern Europe, where gains in a range of 0.5-
0.8% per year are driven largefy by the improvement in agricul-
tural yields. Southern Europe would be severely affected by cli-
mate change, with annual welfare losses of around 1.4% for the 
5.4 °C scenario. 
The sectoral and geographical decomposition of welfare 
changes under the 2.5 °C scenario shows that aggregated Eu-
ropean costs of climate change are much higher for agriculture, 
river flooding, and coastal systems than for tourism (Fig. 3). The 
British Isles, Central Europe North, and Southern Europe ap-
5.4'C 
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1 
_ 
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Fig. 1. Annual impact of 2080sclimate-change scenarios in terms of GDP loss 
(In million €). The scenarios are identified by the average EU temperature 
increase, although temperature is not the only determínant of economic 
impacts. Impacts are determined by the combination of SRES socioeconomic 
scenarios and data, the associated emissions scenarios, and the use of alter-
native climate models, leading to different spatial patterns of the climate 
variables. These factors explain why, for example, the economic costs are 
higher in the EU overall and in most regions under the 3.9°C scenario than 
under the 4.1'escenario. 
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Fig. 2. Annual impact of 2080s climate-change scenarios expressed as per-
cent change in weifare. The scenarios are identifíed by the average EU tem-
perature increase, although temperatura is not the only determínant of 
economíc impacts. Impacts are determíned by the combinatíon of SRES so-
cioeconomic scenarios and data, the assocíated emissions scenarios, and the 
use of afternative clímate models, leading to different spatial patterns of the 
climate variables. These factors explain why, for example, the economíc costs 
arehigherinthe EU overall and in most regions under the 3.9°C scenario than 
underthe 4.1 °C scenario. 
pear to be the most sensitive áreas. Moreover, moving from 
a European climate scenario of 2.5 "C to one of 3.9 °C aggra-
vates the three noted impacts in almost all European regions. In 
the Northern Europe área these impacts are offset by the 
increasingly positive effeets on agricultura. 
The 5.4 C scenario would lead to an annual EU weifare loss 
of 0.7%, with more pronounced impacts in most sectors in all 
EU regions. The agricultural sector is the most important 
impact category in the EU average, as was found in the United 
States (17). The significant damages in Southern Europe and 
Central Europe South are not compensated by the gains in 
Northern Europe. Impacts from river flooding also are more 
important in this case than in the other scenarios, with par-
ticular aggravation in the British Isles and in Central Europe. 
In the 5.4 C scenario with the high SLR (88 cm) variant. wiuch 
would lead to a 1% annual weifare loss in the EU, coastal sys-
tems would become the most important impact category, es-
pecially in the British Isles. 
Discussion 
This study has aimed to estímate the regional distributional im-
plications of climate change in Europe, beyond aggregate im-
pact estimates. We illustrated the feasibility of integratiug the 
relevant scientific disciplines in an "end-to-end" way, ultimately 
providing estimates of physical and socioeconomic impacts on 
the sectoral and geographical scales relevant to the current 
debate on adaptation in the EU. This multidisciplinaiy assess-
ment represents an improvement on monodisciplinary assess-
ments (54). 
Regarding the lessons leamed, one key decisión concems the 
careful selection of climate scenarios, taking into account the 
data needed by impacts modelers and the desirability of work-
ingwith state-of-art climate models while being aware of the vari-
ability of climate model data for the same underlying socio-
economic scenario. Making such a decisión requires scientific 
coordination actively involving all impaets-modeling teams as well 
as climate experts. 
Despite the breadth and depth of this study, the results still 
may be viewed as indicative or merely illustrative because both 
the issue and the proposed methodology are complex and sub-
ject to many caveats and uncertainties. Uncertainties are pres-
ent in all models of the integrated assessment, both in their 
input and structural specification. Tire socioeconomic scenarios 
dnving GHG emissions, the sensitfvity of the climate models to 
GHG concentrations, the specific physical-impact models, and 
the assumptions regarding economíc valuation are all subject to 
uncertainty, and aliare key in influencing the final results. 
Adaptation has been modeled to various degrees in the im-
pact models, because the cost-benefit analysis of adaptation 
strategies is not achievable currently on a European scale. 
Earlier assessments for the coastal systems indícate that adap-
tation policies could be particularly cost efticient for this sec-
tor (55). 
The coverage of impact categories has some limitations, be-
cause it does not consider potentially important impacts (e.g., on 
forestry and transport and energy systems, migration phenom-
ena, and biodiversity losses). The effeets caused by climate 
extremes such as heat waves, storms, and droughts have not been 
considered explicitly, ñor have major economic damages caused 
by low-probability high-impact events (such as collapse or slow-
down of the thermohaline circuí ation). Furthermore, possible 
intersectoral effeets, which often lead to greater vulnerabilities, 
are not considered. TTius, this study possioly underestimates the 
climate impacts on the EU economy. 
The next steps in the research' agenda consist of the ex-
tensión of the impact coverage to include nonmarket effeets, 
weather extremes and catastrophic impacts, the modeling of 
cross-sectoral effeets, the cost-benefit analysis of adaptation, 
the use of dynamic land-use scenarios, and a probabilistic 
assessment of impacts. Equity issues also could be considered 
more explicitly and going beyond the standard efficieney 
analysis by identifying winners and losers in the space and 
time resolution of the adaptation assessment. 
Despite the quasi-static modeling framework of this appli-
cation, impacts can be interpreted genuinely in annual terms, 
because the physical-impact models deliver results on a year-
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Fig. 3. Sectoral decomposítíon of re-
gional weifare expressed as percent 
change. 
by-year basis. Assessing the impacts on long-term economic 
growth would require a truly dynamic muítisectoral approach, 
simulating the economy and climate change to the end of this 
centuiy and specifically dedicated to addressing the issues 
missing in the present analysis, such as capital spillovers and 
path-dependent effects* Such a dynamic setup also would al-
low a better analysis of the times scales of change of adapta-
tion policy. 
In conclusión, there seems to be a need to improve the con-
ceptual framework underlying the multidisciplinary assessment 
of climate impacts and adaptation, particularly by better in-
tegrating the different disciplines in a consisten! way, e+g+í over-
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